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Knowl Process Manag. 2017;1–15.The discovery in September 2015 of diesel emissions software cheat technology in Volkswagen
(VW) cars initiated a process of organisational crisis management and damage limitation by VW,
reflected in the contemporaneous intensive production of public information statements, including
press releases, statements to shareholders and investors, and transcripts of oral evidence. Through
taking stock of a selection of these public information statements, this article examines the
organisational communication management strategies employed to respond to the crisis situation,
making an integrated use of attribution, crisis management, and information orientation theories
as an interpretive lens. An interpretivist, hermeneutic approach was used to carry out qualitative
content analysis on selected statements issued by VW. The analysis reveals that there is a connec-
tion between statements relating to attribution and statements relating to information orientation,
at the time of the crisis and in preparing future action. Priorities for action form part of the overall
crisis management and image restoration approach. Proposed changes in information orientation
constitute a key dimension of the company's public response to mitigate the offensiveness of the
crisis. The analysis performed demonstrates the applicability of the proposed integration of attribu-
tion, crisis management, image restoration, and information orientation theories to better under-
stand and explain how large corporations respond publicly to organisational crisis episodes, more
specifically the ways in which attributions, crisis management, and image restoration strategies are
related to aspects of information orientation as both components and consequences of the crisis.1 | INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2015, the German automotive company Volkswagen
AG (VW) received a notice of violation of the Clean Air Act from the
United States Environmental Protection Agency. It had been found that
certain diesel engines in cars manufactured by VW contained a piece of
software—a “defeat device”—that meant certain emission controls were
only activated during laboratory testing (Volkswagen, 2016a, 2016b,
2016c, 2016e). The result of this is that in real world conditions, some
engines were exceeding U.S. emission limits “by a factor of 15 to 35” (Cen-
ter for Alternative Fuels, Engines and Emissions, 2014). VW admitted that,
unbeknown to the general public, about 11 million cars worldwide were
fitted with the device (Volkswagen, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d,
2015e, 2015f, 2015g, 2015h, 2015i, 2015j, 2015k, 2015l, 2015m, 2015o).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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wileyonWhat ensued from this discovery configures a situation of
organisational crisis for VW, particularly as the series of events that
unfolded was “specific, unexpected, and non‐routine” (Seeger, Sellnow,
& Ulmer, 2003), created uncertainty and mistrust, and presented a
threat to its brand reputation and commercial goals. In an appraisal of
the kinds of threats organisational crisis incidents engender, Coombs
(2007a) proposes that the greatest damage occurs at the levels of pub-
lic safety, financial loss, and reputation loss. Both these definitions indi-
cate that VW faced a situation of crisis. Financial loss is shown as the
company set aside €16.2 billion to deal with the emissions crisis. This
led to VWmaking an annual loss in 2015 of €4.1 billion—its first annual
loss in over 20 years (Volkswagen, 2016d). Reputation loss is shown as,
by December 2015, sales of VW branded cars had dropped by 20%
(Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, 2015). Muller, 2016,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 PAINTER AND MARTINSCEO of VW, described the situation as “the greatest challenge in the
history of [the] Company” (Volkswagen A.G., Volkswagen, 2016d).
Against this backdrop, this study aims to examine the
organisational communication management strategies employed to
respond to the crisis situation, making an integrated use of attribution,
crisis management, and information orientation theories as an inter-
pretive lens. More specifically, this study will (i) explore attributions
made by VW using selected attribution frameworks; (ii) examine the
key elements of crisis management and damage limitation strategies
employed by relating them to relevant theoretical frameworks; (iii)
determine the ways in which attributions inform the crisis manage-
ment process; (iv) identify dimensions of information orientation in
the company's statements; and (v) determine how the perceived level
of information orientation challenges or enhances corporate responsi-
bility and the company's crisis response.
Several frameworks have been proposed for helping organisations
deal with situations of crisis. Process‐oriented approaches such as the
one proposed by Mitroff (1988, 1994) are particularly helpful in organi-
sations' attempt to mitigate vulnerabilities encountered at the different
stages of the crisis life cycle: detection of early signs, prevention and
preparation, containment and damage limitation, recovery, and identifi-
cation of lessons to be learned. Wang and Belardo (2009) combine
Mitroff's process‐oriented framework with elements of knowledge
management strategy, to explore the extent to which knowledge man-
agement positively impacts crisis management. Concerning the use of
knowledge management at the containment/damage limitation stage
—the one that most accurately corresponds to VW's crisis containment
efforts and hence to the focus of this paper—a relationship is
established between an integrated use of knowledge from internal
and external sources and the organisation's ability to control the crisis.
More recently, Ponis and Koronis (2012) propose an integration of
organisational crisis phases with primary knowledge management
activities: knowledge acquisition, selection, generation, assimilation,
and emission. Their analysis reveals pathologies that offer pointers for
the analysis of VW's own knowledge activities, such as the speed, time-
liness, and effectiveness of information dissemination during the crisis
or the organisation's ability to communicate a “fast and reliable resolu-
tion of the ‘what did go wrong’ question” (Ponis & Koronis, 2012).
Previous studies have evaluated multinational corporations' and
high reliability organisations' response during and after large‐scale cri-
ses. De Wolf and Mejri (2013) investigated the 2010 BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill making use of content analysis to examine secondary
data from external sources other than BP. Thatcher, Vasconcelos, and
Ellis (2015) performed a content analysis of four official reports on
the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, looking at the impact of informa-
tion behaviour on information failure, but not examining the organisa-
tion's crisis management strategy.
Through taking stock of a selection of public information state-
ments, this article examines the organisational communication man-
agement strategies employed by VW to respond to the situation of
crisis resulting from the emissions scandal. This is particularly relevant
when recent industry reports identify that 29% of organisations wait
to experience a situation of crisis before constructing a response strat-
egy (Steelhenge, 2014). Research into organisations' responses to situ-
ations of crisis such as the one presented in this article can examinethe role played by public information efforts and inform the design
of successful organisational communication strategies.
In terms of structure, the following section of the article provides a
discussion of the attribution, crisis management, and information orien-
tation theories that will be used as interpretive lens to examine the
organisational communication management strategies employed by
VW. Section 3 introduces and describes the interpretivist, hermeneutic
approach used to carry out a qualitative content analysis of selected
public information statements released by VW. Subsequently, Section 4
presents a detailed content analysis that establishes the links between
attribution, crisis management, and information orientation. This is
followed by a discussion that relates the findings generated back to
the frameworks of attribution and crisis management, image restora-
tion, and information orientation. A final concluding section revisits
the strategies employed by the company, the priorities arising from
those strategies, and how both are linked to information orientation.2 | THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
This section of the article reviews the frameworks and theories that
will be used as lenses to analyse the VW case. The first of these is a
group of attribution theories, which are concerned with identifying
the cause of events and deriving responsibility. Attribution research
is important for the study because it shows how an individual (or in this
case, a company) arrives at a causal inference and what the conse-
quences of such an inference may be.
Second, crisis management theories will be employed as a lens to
examine howVWconducted itself in the wake of the crisis in order to deal
with the three effects of a crisis: public safety, financial loss, and reputa-
tion loss (Coombs, 2007a,b), as well as legal concerns. These two groups
are highly complementary. This is because “people interpret behaviour in
terms of its causes and these interpretations play an important role in
determining reactions to the behaviour” (Kelley & Michela, 1980, p.
458). As crisis management strategies are a type of reaction (although
some might be pre‐emptive), it follows that one should first form attribu-
tions in order to implement appropriate crisis management strategies.
Coombs and Holladay (1996) followed this line of reasoning in developing
their situational crisis communication theory (SCCT), by explaining the
relationship between a situation and communication strategies.
Finally, it will be explored whether these crisis management strat-
egies give any indication as to what aspects (if any) of information ori-
entation theory have been prioritised. Information orientation theory
was devised by Marchand, Kettinger, and Rollins (2002) as a metric
of how effectively companies use and manage information. It is not
within the remit of the research to discover whether VW had a quan-
tified high level of information orientation before, during, or after the
crisis. Rather, it will examine whether VW sought to change any of
the aspects of information orientation as a result of the crisis.2.1 | Attribution theories
Attribution theories stem from the social psychological concept of
attribution, which is the process by which individuals explain the cause
of behaviour. This has since been applied to the study of an
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as opposed to merely that of an individual (Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones,
1979). Attribution theories can help explain why something has hap-
pened in a company or organisation. In the context of the study
reported in this article, they will inform understanding of the crisis
management strategies used by VW to mitigate the effects of the
emissions scandal in terms of customer response and legal liability.
Kelley and Michela (1980, p. 458) define the term “attribution” as
meaning “inference of cause.” Attribution theories describe the pro-
cess of attribution to make sense of events. For instance, if somebody
who is a nervous driver has a crash, it is more likely to reach out for the
explanation that it was their own driving conduct that caused the col-
lision, rather than considering the possibility that they were the inno-
cent victim of a dangerous driver, or simply bad luck.2.1.1 | Internal and external attribution
It has been established that there are two main types of attribution
(Heider, 1958). The first is external attribution, where behaviour is
interpreted as having been caused by situational factors. Internal attri-
bution, on the other hand, is where a behaviour is said to be caused by
internal characteristics or disposition. In either case, Heider (1958, p.
152) developed the notion that the “condition will be held responsible
for an effect which is present when the effect is present and absent
when the effect is absent.”
Taking forward the concept of attribution, Jones and Nisbett (1972)
developed the notion of actor–observer asymmetry, stating that when
seeking explanations for the actions of others, individuals are more likely
to attribute cause to the disposition of the actor than to situational fac-
tors. A number of frameworks have been devised, which focus on the
attribution of disposition as a causal factor for events, including Kelley's
covariation theory (vide Section 2.1.2). In this context, disposition relates
to factors that relate to the actor, such as characteristics or inclination.
Jones and Nisbett (1972) noticed that people tend to pay more
attention to intentional behaviour. They identified that “strong and
confident dispositional inferences are drawn about a person when
we see him or her act under conditions of high choice.” Attribution
theories can easily be applied to the field of information management
to help understand the way organisations operate. If managers are
able to understand the causes of their employees' behaviour, they will
have a greater understanding of how their business works and can
employ future decisions accordingly. For instance, they would gain
the capacity to intervene in working conditions in such a way that
employee motivation is increased, leading to a happier workforce
and an increase in performance. If an organisation understands its
internal and external environments, it is more inclined to act purpose-
fully (Gronhaug & Falkenberg, 1994). It is easy to see how this fits the
context of a crisis. If organisational insiders have a perception of cause
of a crisis, they can make more accurate judgments of suitable crisis
management actions.2.1.2 | Kelley's covariation model
Kelley (1967) developed the covariation model of attribution, identify-
ing three distinct variables that have an effect on attribution. These are
as follows: distinctiveness, meaning the uniqueness of an event asdistinct from the actor's track record; consistency, meaning the degree
to which the event demonstrated the actor running true to type; and
consensus, meaning the degree to which the actor behaved as others
would have or have already done in similar circumstances.
Kelley (1967) found that when distinctiveness is low and consis-
tency is high, an event is more likely to be attributed to the actor's
internal disposition. Hewstone and Jaspars (1988) added the idea of
consensus as a determinant of causal attribution, noting that when
consensus is low, an act is more likely to be attributed to the actor's
disposition. It is noteworthy that Kelley's (1967) covariation theory
relates to attribution, but does not explore the connection between
attribution and responsibility. It is useful therefore only in so far as it
illustrates how people look for causes of events by attributing them
to the actor's disposition and to what degree that disposition accords
with the actor's history. Kelley's (1967) theory does not discuss any
implications of causal attribution.
2.1.3 | Weiner's attribution theory and attribution–
responsibility–action model
Weiner's attribution theory (Weiner, 1995) is used as an additional
framework because, as Yum and Jeong (2014) found, it is useful in
examining why a crisis has happened after it has happened. It is also
useful in deciding whether it is a crisis that is likely to happen again.
Weiner's (1995) attribution theory assumes that individuals try and
determine the causes of other people's behaviours. A person might
attribute a number of causes to another one's action. Weiner (1995)
considered that the process of attribution could be broken down into
three stages. First, a behaviour must be observed by a person. Second,
the person must believe that that the behaviour was performed inten-
tionally. Last, the person must decide whether the behaviour was a
result of coercion, in which case one would assume an external cause,
or free will, in which case one would assume an internal cause in the
individual.
In the “attribution–responsibility–action” model, Weiner (1995)
suggested that people's attributions of cause guide their future actions
such as punishment or preventative measures. Weiner (1995) identi-
fied the two motivations for punishment as utility and retribution. Ret-
ribution is the balancing out of the wrong or injustice, and utility
relates to the prevention of the event's recurrence. It is thought that
retribution is increased where causes of the failure are perceived to
be controllable. In corporate cases, punitive options may be carried
out by individuals and have a behavioural nature, such as boycotting
of consumer products; punitive options may also be legal in nature,
such as prosecution by the state or regulatory authority. Weiner
(1995) does not explore restorative justice: this is where the punish-
ment serves to restore the debt caused by the wrongdoing.
One of the crucial differences between the concept of Weiner's
original attribution theory and its application here is the fact that orga-
nisations consist of individuals, all operating with their own attribution
models, and as a sum of their parts, operating as one.2.2 | Crisis management
Attribution theories can inform crisis management theory, because
response strategies tend to be based on the nature of the cause of
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of the response, such as Coombs' (2006, 2007a, b) covariation attribu-
tion model with its emphasis on consistency and distinctiveness as
dimensions of attribution, and Benoit's (1997) focus on damage
minimisation and confidence restoration.2.2.1 | Coombes' situational crisis communication theory
(SCCT)
SCCT was developed by Coombs (2006) as an application of Kelley's
(1967) covariation attribution model to corporate crisis communica-
tion. It focuses on consistency and distinctiveness as dimensions of
attribution and looks at these in terms of crisis history and relationship
history. Crisis history refers to whether the actor has any history of
similar instances in the past; relationship history refers to how the
actor has performed with respect to other stakeholders in other con-
texts. Both factors are significant in influencing public opinion after a
corporate crisis. SCCT does not, however, examine the consensus
dimension of attribution.
Coombs and Holladay (2002) explain that different crises would
necessitate different communication strategies in order to manage
them effectively. They discussed three significant types of crisis. In
“human breakdown product recall,” a product is recalled because of
human error. The example is used of a hamburger recall by Hudson
Foods after the beef was contaminated with Escherichia coli as a result
of plant employees mistakenly putting contaminated beef back into
the processing machinery. The second type of crisis identified is
“organisational misdeeds with no injuries.” In this case, stakeholders
are knowingly deceived by management, without causing actual harm.
The example is used where Chrysler knowingly manipulated mileage
clocks on new cars to obscure the fact that they had been driven for
miles during tests. The third type of crisis is “organisational misdeed
management misconduct,” where infringements of laws or regulations
are knowingly made by management. An example of this would be fail-
ing to adhere to equal opportunities statutory requirements.2.2.2 | Benoit image restoration discourse theory
In order to evaluate a corporation's course of action to manage a crisis,
it is necessary to pay attention to the way it manages risk as it pertains
to its corporate image. The preservation of corporate image, or resto-
ration of a damaged image, is central to an organisation's response to
threat.
Benoit (1997) developed a theory of image restoration discourse,
looking at ways in which corporate bodies use communication strate-
gies to minimise damage and restore confidence in the corporate
image. It is assumed that the actor (corporation) is held responsible
for an action and that the action is considered offensive. The responsi-
bility or fault may be real or only perceived, but where it exists, the
company's image is at risk. It is essential for companies to identify
the relevant audience (audiences) when using communication strate-
gies to restore their image.
Benoit (1997) identifies five image restoration techniques, which
are denial or shifting of blame; evasion of responsibility (due to provo-
cation, lack of information, accident, or misplaced good intentions);
reduction of offensiveness (by bolstering a positive image; downplayingthe nature of the damage, differentiation from worse instances;
undermining the accusers; offering compensation; or transcendence
of motive); corrective action to restore original condition and prevent
recurrence; and mortification, offering apologies, and remorse. These
techniques have been applied to case studies of crises before. Benoit
and Czerwinski (1997) applied the theory to USAir's response to media
coverage after its aircraft crashed in 1994. It has also been used to
show that Exxon have heavily downplayed damage after the 1989 oil
spill (Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997) and that both corrective action
and mortification were heavily used by AT&T after one of their major
telephone lines failed in 1973 (Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997).
It should be noted that there could be a conflict of interests
between image restoration strategies and the need to avoid future
lawsuits. Benoit (1997) also observes that making assertions that are
later found out to be false would be counterproductive in any image
repair strategy.
2.2.3 | Crisis management and litigation
In the frameworks described in the previous sections, there is a link
between attribution models and crisis management strategy, which is
in turn linked to image restoration strategy. It can also be observed
that some crisis management strategies, particularly image restoration
strategies, may conflict with the need to avoid or minimise legal conse-
quences, whether these be civil lawsuits or prosecutions brought in
respect of offences against the state or other regulatory bodies. Unlike
civil suits, corporate failures or violations that attract prosecution by
the state cannot be written off by compensatory action, although com-
pensatory action and contrition could be held as mitigating factors.
There is limited literature on the relationship between crisis man-
agement and litigation and the ways in which corporations address
these potentially conflicting areas, but warnings about the impact of
releasing statements into the public domain offer useful insight into
the complexity of this matter. Barton (1990) and Jacques (2007) dis-
cuss the need for careful public information communication strategies
when organisations are faced with the risk of litigation. They also dis-
cuss the implications of legal privilege as it relates to different catego-
ries of information and communications. It is noted that all
communications—even those beyond the exchanges between the cor-
poration and counsel—may be taken into consideration in court and
this may impact on what statements the corporation chooses to issue
and to whom. In a similar vein, Tyler (1997) clarifies the wide scope of
liability claiming that it prevents corporate executives from stating
they are sorry about a particular incident, because apologizing effec-
tively means acknowledgement of some kind of responsibility.2.3 | Information orientation
The concept of information orientation was proposed by Marchand,
Kettinger, and Rollins (2000) to determine how the interaction of people
and information, through the use of technology, can affect business per-
formance. Developed in the context of a survey study involving 1,009
senior managers from 169 business teams and originating from differ-
ent companies, nations, and industries, the concept is operationalised
through an optimum “metric of information use” (Kettinger, Zhang, &
Marchand, 2011). The metric consists of three different information
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agement practices (IMP), and information behaviours and values (IBV).
These three capabilities contain 15 different competencies.2.3.1 | Information technology practices
ITP refers to the manner in which a company manages their IT applica-
tions and infrastructure in support of their business decisions. For
example, a company may decide to upgrade their client database sys-
tem to something more complex. If the company grows fast, this could
be a good decision because it could adequately suit a growing client list
and an increase in operations for years to come. If the company does
not expand, it may prove to be unnecessary, expensive, and difficult
for staff to train for and use. A company can improve their information
orientation by using a technology infrastructure that suits their current
and future needs.2.3.2 | Information management practices
IMP refers to the capabilities that manage information successfully in
terms of information collection, processing, and organisation. For
example, if the information a company collects is of poor quality, dupli-
cated, or out of date, errors are likely to be made. Repairing such errors
is a costly and inefficient process. A company can increase their infor-
mation orientation by improving their management of information.2.3.3 | Information behaviours and values
IBV describes capabilities that encourage behaviours and promote
values in staff for successful information use. For example, staff can
be trained to understand the benefits that effective information man-
agement has on their company (efficiency and therefore faster growth)
and their own work‐lives (making their job easier). Complementarily, a
workforce that understands issues surrounding privacy and confidenti-
ality is less likely to make errors that could incur costly legal
consequences.
Information orientation therefore reflects a “people‐centric view
of information use” (Marchand et al., 2002). It is concerned with how
organisational actors can adapt their technology practices, manage-
ment practices, and values to increase performance. Its focus on peo-
ple, rather than solely on technology, means it can be applied to any
organisation, not just IT‐based organisations. However, a review of
the current literature suggests it has not been used in the field of crisis
management before.
It is beyond the scope of this article to determine a quantitative
measure of information use for VW, as this would not be possible
without access to verifiable data about the information orientation of
the business before, during, and after the crisis. This is not in the public
domain. However, as information orientation helps a company to
improve business performance by examining how the organisation
processes information across the three competencies, it will be useful
to look for evidence about certain dimensions of information orienta-
tion as part of the analysis of the emissions crisis. In examining the
public information statements released by VW, it will be possible to
determine whether or not the company displayed characteristics of
information orientation and how these are prioritised in its strategic
response to the crisis.2.4 | Summary
An integrated use of the theories presented above will inform the anal-
ysis of public information statements released by VW regarding the
emissions crisis. First, they will be examined for evidence of Heider's
(1958) internal and external attribution. The dimensions of distinctive-
ness, consensus, and consistency, extracted from Kelley's covariation
model (1967), will then be used to explore the company's responses
in terms of attribution. In complement to this, Weiner's (1995) “attribu-
tion–responsibility–action model” will be mobilised to frame analysis
as it provides a bridge between statements about attribution and the
outcomes from it. Although some of the outcomes are imposed as
the result of legal or regulatory proceedings, the company subsumes
all outcomes into its crisis management and image restoration strate-
gies. Subsequently, Coombs' (2006) SCCT, focusing on consistency
and distinctiveness as dimensions of attribution, will be used to analyse
the public information statements in terms of crisis history and rela-
tionship history.
Finally, the application of Marchand et al.'s (2001) information ori-
entation framework will reveal by abductive reasoning the company's
self‐evaluation of the way it uses information and the priorities it iden-
tifies for the future. Given that the amount of technical information
available from the documents in the data set is small, the focus will
be on two of the competencies identified by Marchand et al. (2001),
namely, the aspects of IMP and IBV. References to both IMP and
IBV will provide a link to both statements of attribution and statements
regarding crisis management and image restoration.3 | MATERIAL AND METHOD
This article is concerned with VW's organisational communication in
the wake of the emissions crisis. More specifically, it analyses the stra-
tegic use of public information statements: how attribution manifests
itself, how information is handled to suit VW's corporate interests
and public duties in the wake of the crisis, how the outflow of informa-
tion is controlled to restore the company's image, and the extent to
which the intersection of these perspectives is a reflection of informa-
tion orientation.
The corpus of public information statements released by VW that
will be analysed includes a comprehensive range of sources that high-
light different perspectives of the distribution of information regarding
the discovery and investigation of defeat devices in VW cars. The
items have been chosen from voluminous amounts of written docu-
ments generated by the company since the onset of the emission's cri-
sis in September 2015. The use of historical documents, rather than
generating data specifically for this research, offered access to a much
wider data set but required the research team to be selective
(Silvester, 2016). The data originate from three main types of sources:
1. press releases, issued by VW and designed for consumption by
the general public;
2. statements to shareholders and investors; and
3. transcripts of evidence presented to the UK Parliament Transport
Select Committee.
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ysis and its provenance. Obtaining a comprehensive range of sources is
crucial in order to gain an accurate understanding of how
organisational communication developed in wake of the crisis, particu-
larly how information regarding the defeat device was presented to
various audiences. To complement this information, Appendix B offers
a timeline of significant events. At the time of writing, the VW case is
ongoing, with new information being released into the public sphere
every day. It was therefore necessary to establish a start and end point
for the data set. It begins on September 2015, with a press release
admitting that the Environmental Protection Agency had found evi-
dence of emission manipulations. The original intention was to end
with the public release of the Jones Day expert and independent
investigation report, originally scheduled for April 2016. However,
VW admitted that releasing it “would present unacceptable risks”
(Volkswagen, 2016b), and this informed the decision to extend the
boundaries of the data set to VW's acceptance in June 2016 of a con-
sent decree in which it agrees to buy back vehicles from consumers in
the United States and to fund manufacturers of clean car technologies.
In order to identify the source of quotations taken from the source
documents, each document in the data set was assigned a number in
chronological order, from 1 to 26 (see Appendix A). Within each docu-
ment, each of the selected statements was numbered in the order in of
appearance within the text. Hence, the reference [1:1] refers to the
first quoted statement from the first document in the list.
The data were analysed following the hermeneutic methodology
(Karppinen, Lehto, Oinas‐Kukkonen, Pätiälä, & Saarelma, 2014). The
data set lends itself to hermeneutic interpretation as a method of anal-
ysis, because of the richness of the material: it consists of long, qualita-
tive accounts of both fact and opinion. In order to find meaning within
them, a detailed and thorough interpretation of the text is necessary,
“alternating between part and whole” of the text, and bringing about
a “progressively deeper understanding of both” (Alvesson & Sköldberg,
2000, p.53). The analysis will therefore reflect “the dialectic between
the understanding of the text as a whole and the interpretation of its
parts” (Mingers & Willcocks, 2004).
All sources in the data set are documents where the author(s) are
aware, at the time of creation, that the materials would be released
into the public domain. In the case of press releases, text has been gen-
erated with the explicit intention of wide public diffusion. This
distanciation, evidenced by all the sources in the data set, means that
the sequential and interpreter‐driven method of hermeneutic analysis
is particularly appropriate in helping to get behind the public face of
the text to discover meaning and purpose.
Hermeneutics permits a wide range of strategies for conducting
actual textual analysis, which can include discourse analysis, taxon-
omies, or open coding using grounded theory. A content analysis coding
method has been adopted based on criteria from the frameworks of
attribution (Kelley, 1967; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Heider, 1958; Kelley
and Michela, 1980; Weiner, 1995), crisis management (Benoit, 1997;
Benoit and Czerwiski, 1997; Coombs and Holladay, 2002; Coombs,
2006), and Marchand et al.'s 2000 information orientation (Kettinger
and Marchand, 2011; Marchand et al., 2002; Marchand and Kettinger,
2011) in order to investigate the organisational communication man-
agement strategies employed by the company in response to theemissions violations crisis. This approach is abductive, which suits the
hermeneutical approach in that it involves the researcher as a compo-
nent of understanding.
An initial reading of all the data corpus revealed to aspects of each
of the frameworks and, from this, an understanding of the data sources
was developed through re‐reading and identifying key passages to evi-
dence the frameworks. In this way, a hermeneutic cycle of sequential
readings was being followed, with analysis being content‐led and
interpreted by the authors.
In order to attain meaningful analysis out of the data corpus, the
contents were coded. Codes were used “as a heuristic” (Saltana,
2009): they were used as an “initial step” (Saltana, 2009) that act as
the foundation for further analysis. Crucially, coding allows to link
between ideas that are prevalent throughout the data set. It is impor-
tant that patterns were identified so that hermeneutic analysis could
be used to extract meaning from the patterns.
Techniques from attributional coding (Silvester, 2016) were used
to analyse and record attributions in the documents during the herme-
neutic cycle. A simple system was developed so that, on further read-
ing, references in the texts could be linked directly to specific
frameworks and elements within the frameworks. Each framework
was assigned a letter, and parts of each framework further broken
down into numbers. Instances of certain attributive processes, crisis
management strategies, or information orientation competencies were
then labelled with the corresponding code. The coding system
employed during the analysis is shown in Appendix C.4 | A HERMENEUTIC STUDY IN
ATTRIBUTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND
INFORMATION ORIENTATION
The previous section offered an explanation of how the hermeneutic
method was used to extract meaning from the data set. The heuristic
coding mechanism (see Appendix C) enabled the systematic labelling
of parts of data showing instances of high or low levels of attribution,
crisis management, image restoration, and information orientation.
These coded instances were then aggregated into three tables corre-
sponding to each framework. The tables in Appendices D, E, and F
show distributions of these instances. This section of the article pre-
sents the findings discovered upon examination of the tables.
The material analysed consists of public information statements
produced by the company for release to the media, or statements from
company representatives in response to questions from regulators or
their representatives. A common feature of voluntary statements is
that they are not triangulated by external investigation. This makes
them the most useful in showing what they reveal about that the
company's priorities, and how it wishes to be seen, rather than the
facts of the case. However, it is important to recognise the potential
to be misled by such information. Volkswagen's public information
statements intended for an audience will have been crafted accord-
ingly; the priorities that Volkswagen is shown to have (implicitly or
explicitly) in their statements may not necessarily be their true priori-
ties. The data set allows only access to VW's perspective.
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management and image restoration strategies. This is particularly the
focus of all statements volunteered for public information, such as
press releases. It is important at this point to establish that the facts
of how and why the software deceit was allowed are not part of this
debate. They were either not known at the point the statements were
issued or deliberately withheld because of the ongoing investigation.
For the greater part, the documents seem to avoid making attribu-
tions. The reasons for this are likely to be twofold: first, VW was seek-
ing to avoid admissions of liability. Second, they needed to be careful
not to prejudge the results of the investigation by Jones Day. Neverthe-
less, there are some attributions made or implied in the VW material
that provide an insightful perspective on their approach to the crisis.
The interim results of the Group Audit investigation (Volkswagen,
2015n) together with evidence given to the UK Transport Select Com-
mittee provide a more direct access to the information orientation and
management practices that contributed to the crisis and ways in which
they could be improved. The linking factor is the way the company
seeks to preserve its “reputational assets” (Coombs, 2006) throughout.4.1 | Attribution
The company's first public response was to issue statements relating to
crisis management and damage limitation. Nevertheless, the attribu-
tions made or implied in the material analysed clearly underlie their cri-
sis response strategy, and this is why attribution is examined first. The
documents give some insight into the attributions made by the com-
pany. In addition to this, some of the texts indicate attributions that
the company would like to be made. These two options are not neces-
sarily the same thing and reflect VW's determination to control the
external attributions of disposition that are or will be made about the
scandal and the company's responsibility for it.
In the dialogue with theTransport Committee, some of the attribu-
tions are suggested by the committee members and then evaluated by
the company representatives. Thus, the Managing Director at VW
Group United Kingdom replies “Yes” to the question “Do you think that
Volkswagen is an ethical company?” [20:48] and again, when asked “Do
you think it knows the difference between right and wrong?”
From some of the earliest statements, it is suggested that the
development and implementation of defeat software is attributed to
a small number of individuals or a group rather than the company as
a corporate entity. It is asserted that “responsible parties will be iden-
tified and held accountable” [7:15] and there is reference to the “mis-
conducts and shortcomings of individuals” [18:10]. This is a
consistent theme either explicitly or implicitly throughout the material
and appears to constitute part of VWs corporate defence.
4.1.1 | Internal and external attributions
The repeated phrase “two rogue engineers” [8:23] becomes shorthand
for attribution to a limited number of individuals and is borne out as
nine employees are suspended. Elements of Heider's theory (1958)
pertaining to identifying external and internal attributions can be
clearly related to these attribution statements. The attributions are
internal when considered from the perspective of the company as a
whole. For instance, the attribution is made to “a group of engineers”[8:28]. However, for the individuals concerned (whomever they are),
the company culture itself becomes a form of external attribution. It
is speculated that the motivation would be to “keep costs down”
[20:40] or find a way of meeting the more challenging U.S. emissions
regulations within the time and budget constrains placed on them,
rather than an internal disposition of the persons involved.
The emphasis that it is the same group of engineers who worked
on solutions for EU and the United States and also on software
updates [20:37, 20:38] seems to present a further example of the com-
pany attempting to tether responsibility to individuals rather than the
organisation. The former CEO of VW, Martin Winterkorn, who
resigned at the end of September 2015, is the only individual named
in the data set. The juxtaposition of the statement that he was
informed about the emissions crisis and then resigned suggests that
some responsibility is attributed to him [21:15].
Some internal attributions do not relate to individuals but are cor-
porate. There is still an internal attribution of disposition, rather than
external situational factors that caused the crisis. The lack of quality
assurance for the developed software is admitted [20:13] and thereby
attributes responsibility for allowing defeat devices to go forward.
Company attitudes such as pressure to meet deadlines or keep costs
down [20:40] and some acknowledged “deficiencies (…) in the
reporting and monitoring systems” [18:18] that allowed the deceit to
be developed may also be considered external, in that they are situa-
tional factors affecting the behaviour of individual employees.
In the documents resulting from the Transport Select Committee
hearings, the VW representatives draw on external attributions relat-
ing the effectiveness of the testing regimes. For example, there are fre-
quent references to the emissions regime [in the EU] being “out of
date” [8:29] and the wider regulations relating to air quality that “needs
to change” [sic] [8:40].
VW repeatedly highlights the fact that existing testing protocols
do test real‐time driving conditions: the inevitable discrepancy
between testing situations and “what happens in the real world”
[8:39] is offered as evidence of the present testing regime failure.
Costs are further mentioned as a reason for the development of defeat
software. These may be seen as an external or an internal factor,
because they relate both to the company culture and to the wider
pressures of business and competition.
4.1.2 | Kelley's covariation model distinctiveness, consis-
tency, and consensus
Many statements validate Kelley's covariation principle and illustrate the
three aspects of distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus to help
determine attribution. A number of statements emphasise the distinc-
tiveness of the events of the scandal both in terms of its contrariness
to the values history of the company and its actions history. The scandal
is presented as “contrary to VW core principles” [7:21]. These are
described in key words such as “solidity, reliability, credibility” [5:8]. The
company sees itself as “ethical” [20:48] and “upstanding [20:31].” Fre-
quent references to the “VW brand” [5:8] act as reminders about endur-
ing core principles, as detailed above, and help to give historical context.
There is emphasis on VW's history of positive environmental
actions including previous green initiatives and reference to the com-
pany “that has invested in environmental efforts” [7:24] and spent
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the company volunteers no instances of the events of the emissions
scandal being consistent with previous actions. The assertion that this
is “not a one‐time action but a series of errors” [18:31] is presumed to
relate only to the events leading up to the discovery of the emissions
scandal, not to previous instances of corporate wrongdoing.
There are some examples of consensus, where the company state-
ments refer to similar instances involving other companies, identifying
practices where it is “allowed to recognise the test” [20:46] and “com-
parable cases involving passenger vehicles” [21:4]. Inversely, the Man-
aging Director at VW Group United Kingdom denies to the UK
Transport Select Committee that he is aware of certain practices being
prevalent in the industry [8:31] and refutes that the whole industry is
dogged by similar problems [20:30]. He seems to be employing a
reverse consensus strategy, by suggesting that if a type of malpractice
is unknown in the industry, it would be highly unlikely to be occurring
at VW in this point.
4.1.3 | Weiner's attribution theory and attribution–
responsibility–action model
Weiner's attribution–responsibility–action model proposes outcomes
to punish attributed wrongdoing or prevent its recurrence. Both
aspects can be seen observed in the documents analysed. Punitive
actions exacted on the company fall into two categories: utilitarian
and retributive. The utilitarian aspects chiefly relate to consumer safe-
guards and restorative practices. These include first and foremost soft-
ware and hardware fixes, paid for by the company, where the “vehicles
will be corrected” [3:1] and buy‐back end of leases schemes in the
United States [23:8]. As a further restorative outcome, the company
has also been required to pay towards costs of consumer protection
training and enforcement measures [23:17].
Measures agreed in the U.S. settlement include $2.7 billion to be
paid over 3 years into an environmental trust [23:15] and $2.0 billion
over 10 years to develop zero emissions vehicles [23:16] may be seen
as both restorative and retributive. Although retributive in their finan-
cial scope, these are also restorative measures in the sense that they
are designed to make practical compensation for the adverse impact
of the emissions deceit upon the environment.
It is anticipated that further retributive measures such as fines,
legal costs [18:29], and potential criminal proceedings against individ-
uals may follow but these, at the point of analysis, are unspecified. It
is assumed that specific measures designed to prevent recurrence will
be identified from the Jones Day report. They are not specified in the
U.S. settlement, although the company itself offers a number of early
suggestions to improve its practices. As these are voluntary measures,
it is more appropriate to discuss them as part of the company's crisis
management and image restoration strategy.
Strategies to prevent recurrence are discussed in detail in the fol-
lowing section on reduction of offensiveness in crisis management and
image restoration strategies.FIGURE 1 Occurrences of crisis management and image restoration
strategies in the data corpus [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]4.2 | Crisis management and image restoration
In the context of Coombs' (2006) SCCT, the VW emissions crisis may
fall into either the “organisational misdeeds management misconduct”or the “organisational misdeeds no injuries” categories. Much of
Coombs' (2006) theory relates to the way crisis management relies
on consistency and distinctiveness, and this is a recurring theme
throughout the data corpus. Added to this, there is evidence of a num-
ber of specific image restoration strategies identified by Benoit (1997).
These are chiefly intended to protect the “reputational assets”
(Coombs, 2006) of the company.
The early responses from the company are all targeted chiefly to
the public and consumer audience. The most common response
targeted on reducing the offensiveness of what had happened (vide
Figure 1). The “reduction of offensiveness” strategy was used twice
as much as any other.4.2.1 | Mortification
Most statements overwhelmingly express mortification, in the form of
various apologies. Some of these apologies are phrased as if coming
from the individual: “I absolutely apologise to all of you and to our cus-
tomers” [8:45]. Other instances involve the personification of the com-
pany, particularly in press releases: “VW deeply regrets the incidents”
[21:2].
Another persistent case of mortification is VW's apparent willing-
ness to accept responsibility for the situation. Emphasis is placed on
how a representative “volunteered” [7:1] to come before the UK
Transport Select Committee, rather than having to be coerced. “Full
responsibility” [7:10] is iterated, as is the company's readiness to
“accept the consequences” [7:12].4.2.2 | Reduction of offensiveness
By far the most common response from VW was to reduce perceived
offensiveness of their actions by downplaying the damage. This is
shown by the chart in Figure 1. VW made repeated references to
how the vehicles still “comply with legal specifications” [5:15],
emphasising the relatively small effect of their actions [8:10], stressing
the fact that the engines “remain safe and legal to drive” [7:16],
highlighting the lack of cost to consumers [18:37] and convenient
recall strategy [8:54], and stating that there is no effect on business
and dealers.
Euphemistic language was employed repeatedly to accentuate the
perception that there is no crisis at all. For instance, VW assert how the
engine “seems [to have] behaved differently” [8:20], using the artistic
language to imply both that the irregularities were unexpected and
that they were somewhat due to the idiosyncratic nature of the engine
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mechanism used to produce the engine irregularities was a defeat
device at all [20:59] and that such labelling is incorrect. In many cases,
the language is deliberately informal, suggesting that VW's focus is on
keeping the public onside. Such language gives off the suggestion that
there are no legal consequences associated to the crisis, which is
another example of downplaying damage. There are clear instances
of responses being worded to avoid the suggestion of legal responsibil-
ity. For example, software is said to be “not adequately described”
[10:3], rather than hidden or misrepresented. Defeat devices are
referred to as “irregularities”; perpetrators are thought to be “a few”
“rogue engineers” [8:23]. Such colloquialisms replace accurate terms,
with the tone being informal and softened.
Another technique VW employed to reduce the offensiveness was
to bolster their positive image, making the problem appear less signif-
icant in comparison. VW highlighted their ethical values such as stating
that they “stand for good and secure jobs” [5:19] and purporting that
their business has not been negatively affected because customers
are “returning to buy vehicles” [20:45]. Statements bolstering positive
image are likely to be targeted at the shareholders and workforce, pro-
moting a vision of the future beyond the current crisis, chiefly focused
on the development of new technology and investment in the work-
force. This is done in response to the need to restore business confi-
dence as well as consumer confidence.FIGURE 2 Crisis management and image restoration strategies
employed in each document [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]4.2.3 | Correction
Correction is a large part of the crisis management response (as well as
part of punitive action—see Attribution). It can be divided into actions
designed to restore the original conditions (in this case, legal conditions
in making the cars compliant) and actions designed to prevent recur-
rence of the incident.
There is emphasis on the way in which corrective actions will be
carried out with respect to customers, which is seen as crucial to the
image restoration process. Early responses speak of “remedy” [7:26]
and the need to “rebuild” [7:13] and “make things right” [7:20]. Later
statements, offered to the regulators, address issues such as compen-
sating the Vehicle Certification Agency [20:75] and Her Majesty's Rev-
enue andCustoms for costs and loss of tax revenues [8:60]. There is also
discussion of new, lower bonus thresholds for dealers whomay struggle
to achieve existing sales targets because of the scandal [8:58]. For
shareholders and the workforce audiences, corrective measures centre
on organisational change, such as company re‐alignment and better
security processes (e.g. “4‐eyes principle” [20:11]). Details are sparse,
probably because they will ultimately depend on specific and as yet
unknown recommendations from the Jones Day investigation.
There are few statements to the public about preventing recur-
rence. Responses to the regulators express intention to “learn the right
lessons” and make sure it “cannot happen again” [7:18]. Finding out
“what went wrong” and avoiding future “misconduct” [11:5] are part
of these responses, but the implied acceptance of a degree of wrong-
doing is evidently not something VW wish to promote to the public
audience.
Finally, statements are used to express differentiation to show
that this behaviour is exceptional and not characteristic of VW as acompany. VW state that they “do not tolerate any kind of violation
of laws” [2:6] and that the incident has gone “against everything the
Group and its people stand for” [5:2].4.2.4 | Differentiation
Positive adjectives were used to describe the company's character
as “ethical” [20:48], “upstanding” [20:31]. The company's historical
legacy was mobilised to emphasise the VW brand and values such
as “solidity, reliability, credibility” [5:8], “sustainability, responsibility”
[5:20]. Their use of language emphasises continuity. For instance,
“continue to stand for good and secure jobs” [5:5] is a largely
unsubstantiated assertion, although there is reference to “billions”
spent on developing hybrid vehicles [20:54]. These statements
may have relevance to all audiences, although particularly the public
and shareholders.
When looking at the entire data corpus, two of the largest docu-
ments—the evidence sessions given to the UK Parliament Transport
Select Committee—stand out as containing the highest variety of crisis
management and image restoration techniques, but comparatively
fewer instances of C3c “bolstering positive image.” This is evidenced
in the two spikes in Figure 2. However, in the other shorter docu-
ments, C3a “bolstering public image” and C3a “downplaying damage”
are used almost exclusively.4.3 | Information orientation
Changes to IO are implied in several of the public information state-
ments VW has issued in response to the crisis. From these, inferences
may be made about the nature of IO prior to the emissions scandal.
However, as this cannot be confirmed from the data corpus, this study
does not attempt to evaluate the levels of IO before or after the emis-
sions crisis. Instead, this study will examine the links evidenced in the
company's response between crisis management (and image restora-
tion) and IO, by identifying the perceived issues and the proposed
solutions.
Two of the IO capabilities proposed by Marchand et al. (2000)—
IMP, and IBV—have been looked at. These have then been broken
down, where appropriate, to demonstrate individual competencies.
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Organisational changes
The company's IMP were under scrutiny, both internally and exter-
nally, throughout the crisis. There is a focus on the need to make
organisational changes to management structure and brands. One of
the core elements of their response is to look at “new structures in
the VW Group” [13:6] and to “fundamentally realign VW” with “leaner
structures” [11:6]. By implication, the management structures were
previously too centralised and should now be “managed in a more
decentralized fashion” [18:43] and too complicated, requiring a reduc-
tion in “managerial complexity” [18:47].
Evidence from the UK Managing Director highlights structural
weaknesses at board level. For instance, the UK Managing Director
states that he has no technical remit, sits on no continental, or global
executive boards and has limited face to face communication with
his German superior:No [I do not sit on the international, the European board
or the world board] [20:79].
I sit on the UK board […] communicate with […] the
supervisory board in Germany [20:80].The statements above suggest a degree of isolation without
autonomy. VW suggest that the benefits of introducing a more
devolved management structure would be to make the company
“more agile” [18:45] and make it easier to “prevent breaches of
regulations” [18:24]. There are several references to giving “more
independence for brands” [13:8, 18:44], although it is noticeable that
the proposal is still to allow the board to “focus on […] cross‐brand
strategies” [13:9]. The implication is that the board will concentrate
on commercial strategies, with operational and technical matters
devolved to the brand.
Improvements in processing competencies
As well as organisational changes, there are specific references to pro-
posed improvements in processing competencies. There is a declared
need to “investigate […] processes, reporting and monitoring systems”
[18:3], and VW acknowledge that there are “weaknesses in some pro-
cesses” [18:8]. The processing issues can be broken down further into
systems and responsibilities. Systems that are challenged relate specif-
ically to “test and certification processes” [18.11] and quality assur-
ance, of which “there was none before” [20:13].
With regard to responsibilities within processing, it is
acknowledged that “responsibilities were not sufficiently clear”
[18:19]. These issues are addressed by proposing the “ ʻ4‐eyesʼ princi-
ple in software development” [20:11], which should help by
“streamlining decision‐making processes” [18:46] and also a check on
quality assurance.4.3.2 | Information behaviour and values
The central thrust of VW's response in terms of IO relates to the infor-
mation behaviour and values dimension. The comments made exhibit
six of the IO competencies: integrity, formality, control, transparency,
sharing, and proactiveness (Marchand et al., 2000).Integrity
Integrity relates directly to crisis management strategies to reduce
offensiveness of the action by bolstering the company's positive image.
VW also use it to differentiate the current situation from VW's previous
behaviour and attitude. The latter aspect is crucial in evaluating attribu-
tion, with VW relying heavily on promoting the distinctiveness of the
present case from the company's track record and core values.
There is an assumption that the company's core values are sound
and remain unchanged. This is an important part of their defence, as
they say that “commitment and social responsibility […] must be main-
tained” [13:12]. Nevertheless, it is suggested that there needs to be a
“realignment of the Group's culture and management behaviour”.
Integrity is also relevant to how mistakes are viewed. Interestingly,
some breaches of rules seemed to be tolerated, but mistakes were not.
VW argue that there is a need allow for mistakes “as an opportunity to
learn” [18:54]—in other words, as part of the creative process.
Formality
Formality is to be increased by having “sharply defined and binding
powers and responsibilities” [18:17], and processes “developed more
strictly in accordance with the 4‐eyes principle” [18:14]. According to
VW, “Four eyes means nobody can do anything on their own” [20:22].
Control
An increase in formality is associated with an increased level of control
over individuals and procedures. It is suggested that this will be
extended further once the findings from the internal investigation are
published, when “internal compliance structures” will be put in place
“to address those findings” [19:2]. It is also suggested that there is
enhanced control from external agencies as “publication of figures
[…] must meet regulatory standards” [8:65].
Transparency and sharing
Transparency and sharing are two closely interlinked dimensions. Ref-
erences to a commitment to “transparency and openness” [8:3] and
“full transparency” [10:6] are multiple throughout the document data
set. There is further evidence of this, such asObligation to become transparent, with testing in the real
world [20:35].This introduces the idea of genuine openness, with more company
information (particularly test results) put into public domain, and not
limited to statutory requirements. This is reiterated throughout the
data set, through statements such as “We need transparency and
openness” [8:32] or “commitment to full transparency” [10:6].
References to transparency also permeate responses relating to
the investigation itself, although the company line is more guarded.
For example,We have been as transparent as we can [20:64].
I find it implausible that if you employed independent
lawyers you would edit the report [20:38].The statements above imply a defensive tone when talking about
the investigation report and the possibility that the contents might be
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the sharing of information from the investigation report that may
be seen to undermine the declared resolution to “inform the public”
[4:7], because “disclosure … would prejudice the rest of the investiga-
tion” [22:2].
There is more confidence in proposing measures to improve infor-
mation sharing within the company, including “open discussions, closer
co‐operation” [18:53] and “co‐operation between Board … and the
Works Council” [16:5]. This “new, open culture of co‐operation”
[11:7] is envisaged as extending to all stakeholders and particularly
the shareholders. There are multiple references about openness and
transparency with regard to shareholders, who are obviously a critical
target for crisis management and damage limitation strategies. Thus,
there is a reaffirmation that “VW will report to the shareholders”
[4:6], and act “seeking shared decisions in the interest of the company,
shareholders and employees” [16:6].
Crucially, VW intends to share more with outside regulators, with
external verification of emissions tests [18:26].
Proactiveness
There is evidence in the data set of the company's proactiveness
capability within information orientation. VW is determined to
“drawn up an action plan” [5:10], but the proactive response goes
further than addressing the immediate aftermath of the crisis. There
is a focus on looking “beyond the current situation and create the
conditions for VW's […] further development” [13:1], which is
focused in the “TOGETHER‐Strategy2025” [23:6]. The thinking
behind this is both strategic with “new alignment” that “affects think-
ing and […] strategic goals” [18:42] and economic, there having been
an avowed need to “make decisions that factor in economics just as
much as employment” [16:1].
In addition to this, there is the implication that this “Clear mission”
[18:58] will have a positive effect on the company's ability to recover
after the crisis and become “better and stronger” [18:59]. Hints of
change management strategies to be employed are also presented,
with “renewal of personnel” [18:49] at the top, “co‐operation between
Board of Management and Works Council” [16:5] and, again, in the
launch of “Strategy2015” [23:6].4.4 | Summary
From the data corpus, there is a clear focus on reducing the offensive-
ness of the action by downplaying the negative effects and statements
relating to this strategy significantly outnumber those on other
strategies.
The second most prevalent strategy referred to in the data is that
on correction by restoring original condition. Taken with statements to
downplay the damage, there seems to be a consensus that the
company's primary focus was to present a situation where everything
is, or will soon be, fine and satisfactory. Over time, there also appears
to be a slight movement in crisis management emphasis from mortifi-
cation in the early stages to prevention of recurrence later on.
Overall, a multi‐faceted response is maintained throughout,
although there is some differentiation by audience. Statements
directed to the public or consumer audience are heavily focused onmortification, downplaying the damage and correction to restore orig-
inal conditions. Statements directed to the regulators and shareholders
are more concerned with evasion of responsibility, bolstering the pos-
itive image of the company, and correction to prevent recurrence.
Statements aimed at differentiating the mistakes of the emissions crisis
from VW's previous behaviours are focused strongly on the regulators
and employees.5 | DISCUSSION
5.1 | Attribution
Heider's theory (1958) describing internal and external attribution was
useful in clarifying statements relating to both corporate and individual
responsibility. In the context of VW, it was interesting to discover that,
whilst the corporate culture could be seen as an external attribution
from the point of view of an individual employee, external attributions
could be made if the corporate body itself was under pressure from
outside agencies such as the tighter emissions controls in the Unites
States and scope for variation within the results submitted under dif-
ferent testing regimes.
Attributions regarding the origins of the software deceit are for
the most part internal: They are either attributions to individual
employees or attributions of disposition with respect to the company
itself. One of the main thrusts of the crisis management strategy is
to acknowledge responsibility and reflect this positively in contrition
and mortification in the public sphere.
The treatment of attribution by VW is clearly very carefully
worded. Although the company acknowledges an element of overall
responsibility, the statements are guarded with regard to attributions
about specific areas where they could be found liable. The attributions
that they do make (or wish the public to make) inform their use of crisis
management and image restoration strategies.
It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the legal response to
VW's emissions deceit. It would appear, from many of the statements
relating to attribution, that the company is being careful to avoid com-
ments that could trigger any further legal liability. There is a careful dis-
tance between reference to the Jones Day internal investigation,
whose “findings […] must hold up in court” [18:30] and “We […] take
full responsibility for our actions” [7:10].
Through applying Kelley's (1967) co‐variation model as an inter-
pretive lens, a number of instances of distinctiveness being used to
reduce the attribution of disposition with respect to the company have
been identified. VW makes similar points of differentiation as part of
its crisis management and image restoration strategy, to mitigate the
negative effects of the scandal on its corporate image. It is not in doubt
that the events of the emissions scandal will be attributed to the com-
pany to some extent and that there will be both punitive and utilitarian
judicial consequences. The settlement agreement of the U.S. Federal
Regulators, Private Plaintiffs, and 44 U.S. states [26] requires VW to
make large financial contributions to environmental protective and
research initiatives. This is both punitive and utilitarian, following Wei-
ner's model (1995), being simultaneously a retributive and a restorative
measure. As the latter, it provides an element of correction, which the
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and a route towards eventual image restoration.5.2 | Crisis management and image restoration
VW's public acceptance of responsibility and repeated apologies for
the software deceit gives it an opportunity to demonstrate some of
the positive corporate values that it publicly claims to espouse. The
manner in which the crisis is managed therefore becomes an opportu-
nity in itself to promote a better company image. This is developed fur-
ther in the many assertions about the company's history as “an
upstanding company” [20:31] “that has invested in environmental
efforts…” [7:24]. These statements serve to minimise the effects of
the crisis by differentiating it from previous actions.
The core of the company's crisis management strategy rests in
reducing the offensiveness of the actions that took place. This is con-
sistently addressed by downplaying the damage caused and state-
ments relating to this strategy significantly outnumber those on all
other strategies. This is further enhanced by the use of euphemistic
language to describe the details of the offence. The use of examples
to bolster the positive image of the company, with a strong forward‐
looking focus on jobs and investments, gives context to the offence
and serves to reduce its overall significance.
The second most prevalent crisis management and image restora-
tion strategy referred to in the data is that of correction by restoring
original condition. Taken with statements to downplay the damage,
there seems to be a consensus that the company's primary focus was
to present a situation where everything is, or soon will be, “alright”.
Although technical fixes on the affected vehicles are the most immedi-
ate priority, a large part of the emphasis on correction relates to restor-
ing consumer (and investor) trust, and the latter is arguably the
company's highest priority over time.
There is a declared intention to prevent recurrence, to “learn the
right lessons and avoid such misconduct in future” [11:5]. The resolu-
tion to achieve this is clearly part of the company's rehabilitation strat-
egy as far as consumers and investors are concerned.Much of the detail
as to how this is to be achieved relates to information orientation.
In analysing the data corpus, a slight movement in the emphasis of
crisis management strategies is observed: from mortification in the
early stages to prevention of recurrence later on. Figure 2 introduced
in the previous section reveals a preference for downplaying damage
and a slight tendency to bolster positive image in the press releases
and announcements to shareholders. These are the shortest docu-
ments. This might suggest that VW favoured these strategies where
verbosity was not suitable and also that they perceive them as the
most generally effective strategies. Upon further examination of
Figure 2, it can be observed that the “bolstering positive image” strat-
egy was not employed at all in document 8 and not employed much in
document 20. These were the two Transport Select Committee evi-
dence sessions that give room to the question of why was this strategy
not employed here. One possible reason may be because VW were
catering for a different kind of audience in these documents—a panel
of regulators instead of the general public (containing potential cus-
tomers) or shareholders (already invested in the company), who do
not have a necessary interest in VW being successful.Overall, a multi‐faceted response is maintained throughout,
although as discussed above, there is some differentiation by audience.
Statements directed to the public/consumer audience are heavily
focused on mortification, downplaying the damage, and correction to
restore original conditions. Statements directed to the regulators and
shareholders are more concerned with evasion of responsibility and
correction to prevent recurrence. Statements aimed at differentiating
the mistakes of the emissions crisis from VW's previous behaviours
are focused strongly on the regulators and employees.5.3 | Information orientation
Statements made by VW representatives to the UK Transport Com-
mittee, and also to shareholders, are particularly revealing about
aspects of information orientation in the company. Whilst it is not pos-
sible, within the scope of this study, to quantify levels of information
orientation in the company either before the beginning of the crisis
or afterwards, there is much valuable insight to be gained about per-
ceived issues relating to information orientation and the status this will
be given in the future, as a result of the emissions crisis. The company
acknowledges a number of weaknesses in information orientation that,
on the face of it, contradict the robust statements made in other parts
of the dataset about VW values and relationship history with regard to
consumers and the environment. Many of the attributions made about
the company's responsibility, either corporately or individually, for the
emissions deceit can be linked directly to statements about changes
that it has identified as needed within information orientation.
It can be seen that “Deficiencies in some areas of VW's IT infra-
structure” [18:21] links to multiple references to changes in company
organisation through restructuring, decentralisation, and realignment.
Similarly, the lack of information sharing (“I find it implausible that
senior people in the company would have known” [8:62]) leads to
“Changes are necessary in howWV communicates” [13:12]. The state-
ment that it was “clear that some of the work processes needed to be
improved” [20:44] is an acknowledgement of internal corporate
responsibility and leads directly to remarks about “streamlining deci-
sion‐making processes” [18:46] and the introduction of the “four‐
eye” principle in software development” [20:11].
Given the nature of the documents in the data set, it is under-
standable that there is not a great deal of technical detail about
changes to the organisational and processing competencies within
information orientation. It is, however, possible to detect a clear
emphasis overall on changes to the information behaviour and values
capability, particularly in the capabilities of transparency and sharing.
This appears to corroborate the company's implied defence that the
emissions deceit was perpetrated by a small number of individuals
within one department and without the knowledge of senior
management.5.4 | Summary
The process of corporate rehabilitation after a crisis is initiated in the
public sphere by press releases and reflected in every statement pub-
licly made, including statements to stakeholders and evidence pro-
vided to regulatory bodies. The company's public attributions
PAINTER AND MARTINS 13regarding causation of the crisis must necessarily be consistent with
the strategies it uses to manage the critical situation and to restore
corporate image. In the case of VW, issues relating to different aspects
of information orientation are presented as part of attribution
(causation) and also part of crisis management and image restoration
(consequence). Without specific detail of IMP or information behav-
iour and values in the company prior to the crisis, or subsequently, it
is not possible to quantify levels, or changes, in information orienta-
tion. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the company has identified in
information orientation both the roots of and the remedy to its prob-
lem. The acknowledgement of the problem and the declared intention
to address those issues is a common thread in the company's public
statements. It cannot at this stage be determined whether the views
internally within the company align accordingly.6 | CONCLUSION
The study reported in this paper makes an integrated use of attribu-
tion, crisis management, image restoration, and information orientation
theories to better understand and explain how VW responded publicly
to the discovery of diesel emissions software cheat technology in VW
cars as an episode of organisational crisis communication.
Through conducting a hermeneutic analysis of public information
statements, it was possible to identify attributions made, or implied,
by VW and gain insight into the company's attitude towards its
own responsibilities and liabilities. This in turn was reflected in a
number of the strategies employed to manage the crisis and restore
corporate image.
The coding of public information statements was informed by the
integrated use of attribution, crisis management, and information ori-
entation theories as interpretive lens. This facilitated the identification
of specific strategies employed by the company and the priorities aris-
ing from those strategies.
As well as the inter‐relation between attributions and crisis man-
agement strategies, it was clear from the study of these aspects that
both were linked to information orientation, as a pre‐existing condition
before the crisis and as a potential means of remedy in the aftermath.
A number of attributions were made concerning information orienta-
tion that implied pre‐existing problems in this domain that enabled
the emissions deceit to be perpetrated and contributed to the crisis
overall. Many of the company statements explicitly refer to its resolu-
tion to make changes to and improve information orientation, and it
was clearly important to demonstrate this intention to the public in
order to minimise negative outcomes by making corrections and also
to bolster consumer and investor confidence for the future. Although
the analysis of crisis management and image restoration strategies
forms the centrepiece of this study, information orientation provides
a bridge into the company's future actions, by establishing a link from
causal attributions to restorative and preventative reparations.
It is not possible at this stage to gauge how successful VW had
been at handling the crisis. This would only be possible with the hind-
sight of future years' financial performance and feedback on company
image. The paper looks at how VW wanted to be seen to deal with the
crisis, rather than examining any internal actions. To some extent, thelatter could be triangulated to the Jones Day investigation; however,
VW is currently withholding it from public release.
Nevertheless, and although each crisis is different thus requiring
non‐programmed responses, there are key managerial implications that
stem from this research. Crises offer an opportunity for organisational
learning (Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2008), which should engage man-
agers in a comprehensive assessment of both the immediate fixes and
the far‐reaching remedies that may take the shape of organisational
policy. More specifically, VW's choice of strategies/priorities for man-
aging the crisis through damage limitation reflect a rather reactive,
defensive approach in information flow (e.g., denying knowledge and/
or responsibility and downplaying impact), when in periods of crisis,
completeness and an assurance that the organisation understands the
full attributes of the crisis and is coping with it (fully addressing the con-
cerns of stakeholders, regulators, and customers) are generally associ-
ated with effective crisis management (Reilly, 1993).
To conclude, the analysis performed demonstrates the suitability
of the proposed integration of attribution, crisis management, image
restoration, and information orientation theories to better understand
and explain how large corporations respond publicly to organisational
crisis episodes. This approach extends the scope and reach of existing
research into corporate attitudes and information behaviour leading to
critical incidents such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster (Thatcher
et al., 2015) and the Deepwater oil spill (Wolf and Mejri, 2013), where
it would be useful to investigate the dimension of information orienta-
tion before and after crisis.
It is acknowledged that the present study is limited in its exclusive
use of data produced by VW sources. These sources have the advan-
tage of revealing the priorities VW would like its audience to believe
they have. However, there is a possibility that these explicit or implicit
priorities are red herrings, because there is no guarantee that the state-
ments VW released for public information are reflective of the organi-
sation's actual behaviours or ambitions. Future research endeavours
should therefore concentrate on triangulation and on the enrichment
of the current data corpus with material extracted from independent
reports and interviews with organisational insiders, consumers, and
shareholders.
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